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We demonstrate that secure quantum key distribution sys-
tems based on continuous variables implementations can oper-
ate beyond the apparent 3 dB loss limit that is implied by the
beam splitting attack [6]. The loss limit was established for
standard minimum uncertainty states such as coherent states.
We show that by an appropriate postselection mechanism we
can enter a region where Eve’s knowledge falls behind the in-
formation shared between Alice and Bob even in the presence
of substantial losses.
The distribution of random keys for cryptographic pur-
poses can be made secure by using the fundamental prop-
erties of quantum systems such that any interception of
the key information can be detected. This was rst dis-
cussed for discrete systems [1] and experimental demon-
strations have been carried out using optical sources,
which produce low photon number states [2]. More re-
cently schemes based on continuous quantum variables
have been proposed [3{6]. Apart from being of funda-
mental interest these schemes oer certain practical ad-
vantages. However, they all share one major disadvan-
tage: currently it is thought that the use of continuous
variable techniques does not allow quantum key distri-
bution (QKD) beyond 50 % loss [6] at least as long as
advanced technologies such as entanglement distillation
are not available. This severely limits the applicability
of such schemes.
The argument leading to this limit is based on an opti-
mal cloning approach for optical signals that corresponds
to a beam splitting attack on the signals [6]. At the loss
limit an eavesdropper Eve can replace the lossy channel
by a perfect one with an adapted beam splitter to mimic
the losses. She can then generate a cloned signal with
a delity which depends on the beam splitter transmis-
sion. In order to extract a secure key out of the material
with the usual privacy amplication tools, however, the
mutual information between Alice and Bob IAB has to
exceed the information that each of them shares with
Eve: IAB > maxfIAE , IEBg [7], which is not fullled in
the case of 50% or more loss.
On the other hand in certain situations it is still pos-
sible to create a secure key even if this condition is vio-
lated. For classical correlations the procedure is known as
advantage distillation [7]; upon closer investigation this
turns out to be a form of postselection. Postselection is a
standard intrinsic procedure in conventional QKD with
weak pulses: if no photon is detected by Bob, or when
Alice and Bob did not measure in the same basis, the cor-
responding time slot is ignored and hence does not con-
tribute to the raw data. Without this postselection the
condition IAB > maxfIAE , IEBg could never be reached
for any QKD protocol for losses beyond 3 dB, because
then Eve has access to better signals than Bob. However,
postselection allows unconditionally secure key exchange
in presence of large losses, limited basically only by the
photo-detection process [8]. The situation becomes more
subtle for continuous variable schemes, since then always
a non-vacuum signal reaches Bob and correlations appear
between the data measured by Bob and that of an po-
tential eavesdroppers via Alice’s state preparation. Thus
the postselection has to be made more conscious, and
here we show how to do this. The selection of favorable
data for Alice and Bob has been previously addressed
in the context of implementing the BB84 protocol with
weak coherent pulses in the presence of a strong phase
reference pulse [9]. Our results demonstrate that con-
tinuous variables and weak coherent pulse schemes are
closely linked in the basic principles.
We consider the following scheme, which is similar
to those proposed by Cerf et al. [5] and Grosshans
and Grangier [6]. Alice sends an ensemble of coher-
ent states to Bob with a Gaussian distribution of com-
plex amplitudes centered on the vacuum. Bob mea-
sures either of two conjugate quadratures, say for ex-
ample the in- and out-of phase quadratures X and Y ,
using homodyne detection. The measurement results
x are then given as eigenvalues of quadrature operator
x^λ = 12 (a^e
−iλ + a^yeiλ) with λ = 0, or pi2 . Bob will ef-
fectively see a Gaussian distribution of real amplitude
coherent states when he looks at the quadrature X and
a Gaussian distribution of imaginary amplitude coherent
states when he looks at the quadrature Y . Bob reveals
which quadrature he measured in each time interval and
estimates whether Alice prepared a coherent state with
a positive or negative displacement in the corresponding
quadrature. Alice and Bob can now interpret positive
displacements as logical "0" and negative ones as logical
"1".
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For our analysis of the security of this scheme we ex-
tend this protocol and specify the used states by addi-
tional steps. After Bob’s publication of his choice of the
quadrature, Alice will interpret the state she sent either
as a member of the set fj − α e−iθi, jα eiθig, if Bob
detected the quadrature X , or fj − iα e−iθi, jiα eiθig
(α 2 R), if Bob measured the quadrature Y . She now
publishes the values of α and θ. In each case, from
Bob’s and Eve’s perspective, this narrows down the num-
ber of possible signals to two, for example jα eiθi or
j − α e−iθi. Thus Alice and Bob can build up a secret
key as before when now the encoding reads more specif-
ically: jα eiθi ! "0", j − α e−iθi ! "1" for amplitude
measurements and jiα eiθi ! "0", j − iα e−iθi ! "1"
for phase measurements. Other choices of signal sets are
possible, for example sets with point symmetry, but the
choice above turns out to be favorable.
To investigate the secrecy of the key the distribution
of Bob’s data conditioned on the choice of Alice can be
accessed using classical communication. For this purpose
Alice and Bob open up complete signal descriptions and
measurement results for some randomly chosen transmis-
sion events. Thus the statistics of Bob’s detected results
should mirror Alice’s coherent state preparation with ex-
pected Gaussian distributions centered according to the
complex amplitude displacements.
Eve’s rst strategy is thus passive intervention via the
beamsplitter attack [6]. Eve’s intervention is indistin-
guishable from loss. In the typical loss model Alice’s
state is transformed as
jα eiθiB j0iE
! jpη α eiθiB j
√
1− η α eiθiE (1)
for arbitrary α and θ, where η is the transmission e-
ciency between Alice and Bob. Alice and Bob are none
the wiser but Eve ends up with all the lost signal. It
was shown [6], that provided the loss is less than 50% it
is still possible for Alice and Bob to distill a secure key
when faced with such an attack. We will now show that
in fact 50 % loss is not an ultimate limit for secure QKD.
We wish to nd a way by which Alice and Bob can
postselect a subset of the data for which they have a
high mutual information, but for which Eve and Alice do
not. Alice and Bob can base their selection procedure on
the parameter α and θ characterizing the state prepara-
tion and Bob’s measurement results x or y. The overall
mutual information of Alice and Bob can then be subdi-
vided into dierent effective information channels char-
acterized by the parameters (α, θ, x) (where x stands for





dx dα dθ p(α, θ, x)  IAB(α, θ, x).
(2)
Similarly the overall information Alice shares with Eve




dα dθ p(α, θ)  IAE(α, θ). (3)
Note, that the separable nature of the state of Eq. (1) en-
sures that there is no correlation between Bob’s and Eve’s
quantum uncertainties. Thus Eve’s mutual information
with Alice does not depend on Bob’s detected outcome
x. Furthermore, Eve shares with Bob always less infor-
mation than with Alice, IBE < IAE , and it is sucient
to consider Alice and Eve’s information only. Altogether,
this allows us to evaluate the knowledge of the dierent
parties separately for all eective information channels
and we can restrict our analysis to nd suitable param-
eters (α, θ, x) with IAB(α, θ, x) > IAE(α, θ). Since the
beam splitting attack and protocol itself are symmetrical
in respect to the considered conjugate quadratures, it is
also sucient to investigate only the case of a quadrature
measurement X by Bob.
To identify the good eective channels, we calculate
the mutual information shared by Alice and Eve. Al-
ice sends a priori pure states. However knowing noth-
ing about Alice’s state preparation Eve would have to
distinguish between two allowed mixed states character-
ized by positive or negative displacements in the respec-
tive quadrature. So far no general expression for the ac-
cessible information is known for non-orthogonal mixed
states. For this reason we provide Eve with the addi-
tional information about α and θ. As a trade-o Eve
has to distinguish for each eective channel between two
non-orthogonal pure states. Since we have chosen with-
out loss of generality to consider the X quadrature here,
these states are jα eiθi and j − α e−iθi. In this situa-
tion the maximum accessible information is known. It is
given as a function of the overlap f of the respective two







1− f2(α, θ)) log(1 +
√






1− f2(α, θ)) log(1 −
√
1− f2(α, θ)). (4)
For an eective channel with parameters α and θ the
overlap can be calculated as
f(α, θ) = h−α e−iθjα eiθi = expf−4  (1− η)  E2g, (5)
where we dened E = α cos(θ). The protocol ensures
that the overlap and thus the mutual information of Eve
depends only on the effective amplitude E = α cos(θ).
As we will see later, the parameters α and θ enter the
mutual information of Alice and Bob only in the same
combination. This allows us to consider in the following
the parameters (E, x) only.
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Next, we calculate the mutual information of Alice and
Bob. According to the protocol Bob performs quadrature
measurements and decodes the bit value as the sign of the
detected displacement. Depending on the signal states
jα eiθi, his outcomes x are distributed corresponding
to one of the probability distributions






with jx0i as the eigenstate of the quadrature operators





P (xjjα eiθi)+P (xjj−α e−iθi) for x > 0
P (xjjα e−iθi)
P (xjjα eiθi)+P (xjj−α e−iθi) for x < 0 (7)
To illustrate Bob’s decoding we consider in Fig. 1 the
case of 50% loss and an eective amplitude of E = 1.
The left graph depicts the two possible distributions for
Bob’s results x corresponding to Alice’s states jα eiθi and
j − α e−iθi. For the intersection point at x = 0, Bob’s
measurement delivers no information, but for all other
values of x, the distribution corresponding to Alice’s en-
coded bit value is more probable. In the right graphs we
plotted the probability that Alice has encoded a "0" or
"1", if Bob actually obtained the value x. With the ar-
ranged bit assignment the smaller value of these graphs
gives Bob’s error probability corresponding to Eq. (7).
Alice’s and Bob’s mutual information can now be cal-
culated separately for all eective information channels
with (x, E) by the Shannon formula
IAB(x, E) = 1 + pe log2 pe + (1 − pe) log2(1− pe) . (8)
We are now in a position to identify those eective in-
formation channels with IAB(x, E) > IAE(x, E), which
allow to extract a secret key. Fig. 2 displays the dier-
ences of the respective information plotted for the events
(E, x) again in the case of 50% loss. Positive valued ar-
eas, indicating region of possible secure key exchange, are
colored bright, negative ones in dark. Thus our investiga-
tion allows us to model an ideal postselection procedure,
where all events (x, E) with IAB > maxfIAE , IEBg ac-
tually contribute to the key.
The comparison of Fig. 2 between the mutual infor-
mation of Alice and Bob and the information they share
with Eve displays an insight that was rst recognized
in [9]. Alice and Bob can postselect statistically occur-
ring events with large x to decrease the error rate for the
shared bit values. On the other hand, Eve’s error rate for
the selected data is unchanged, because her conditional
state is uncorrelated to Bob’s results x. Furthermore
there exist for each transmission η an optimum eective
displacements E , such that the mutual information be-
tween Alice and Bob is maximized.
We can evaluate the key rates Rk, that can be achieved
in the presented postselection process as
Rk = Rr 
∫
S
dx dE p(x, E)  [IAB(x, E) − IAE(x, E)], (9)
where Rr is the raw data rate, and S denotes the subset
of selected eective channels. For the presented protocol
the probability p(x, E) that the eective channel is used
is composed of Gaussian distribution of the eective am-
plitude E and the distribution of x conditioned on E.










(P (xjjα eiθi) + P (xjj − α e−iθi)) (10)
with P (xjj  α eiθi) given in Eq. (6).
First numerical calculations, where we limited our in-
tegration over the data set within 4, indicate that in
the presence of 50% loss and for an optimized parameter
of d = 2.1, bit rates up to Rk = Rr  0.0667 are achiev-
able. For a loss rate of 75%, we have found a key rate
of Rk = Rr  0.0073. These calculations show that the
high repetition rates of continuous variable technology,
which is expected to be in the GHz region, can actually
lead to secure key rates that are well above currently
implemented schemes.
We have shown that continuous variable QKD using
coherent states in the presence of losses above 50% can
still be implemented securely against an eavesdropper us-
ing an individual beam splitter attack. The postselec-
tion process solely relies on classical data processing and
thus does not require sophisticated quantum resources
other than coherent states. An absolute proof of secu-
rity would require the analysis of a more general attack
by Eve. However, it is likely that the beam splitting at-
tack is the optimal attack even in this protocol utilizing
postselection. The existence of optimum eective dis-
placements for the mutual information between Alice and
Bob opens the possibility to construct more elaborated
protocols with modied probability distributions for Al-
ice’s state preparation to achieve higher the bit rates.
However, in all such protocols one has to be cautious to
ensure that the beam splitting attack remains the best
eavesdropping strategy.
Our result pushes continuous variable QKD closer to
practical applications. In addition we have also shown
that the type of postselection protocol considered here
can also be employed for schemes using squeezed light,
such as in [4].
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FIG. 1. Illustration of the error rate of Bob’s decoding
scheme, here for a loss of 50% and an eective amplitude
E = α cos(θ) = 1. Left: probability distributions of Bob for
prepared bits "0" and "1"; Right: probability that Alice has
encoded "0" or "1", if Bob obtained a result x.
FIG. 2. Comparison of the mutual information between
Alice and Bob and the information they share with Eve
for dierent state preparations with eective amplitude
E = cos(α) and measured outcomes x of Bob. Positive ar-
eas, colored bright, indicate eective information channels
that contribute to secure key exchange since they satisfy
IAB(x, E) > IAE(x,E).
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